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Abstract
A standard result in the literature on environmental economics is that
efficient environmental policies regulating transboundary pollution will be
adopted only if there is interjurisdictional coordination.  Efficient policies
can be adopted as a result of interregional treaties or mandated by a
central authority. The present paper demonstrates that if there is perfect
population mobility between the regions affected by the transboundary
pollution, the efficient outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the policy game
between regional authorities. This is true independently of what policies
are available to the regional authorities. However, there may be more than
one Nash equilibrium, so that policy coordination may be necessary in
order to achieve the best equilibrium.
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With transboundary externalities, regional policy choices are the strategies of a policy game
played between sovereign regions.  It is well known that the equilibrium of the game is
inefficient. In this paper we demonstrate that if interregional migration is free and costless,
socially optimal policy can be supported as a Nash equilibrium.  If the equilibrium is unique,
neither interregional cooperation nor centralized regulation improves the non-cooperative
outcome.  There may be many equilibria, and if so, some form of  coordination is necessary to
insure efficiency.
Transboundary environmental problems are characterized by the environment in a region being
affected directly by actions taken in one or more other regions
1. We use the term “region” as a
geographical area that is a jurisdiction with some degree of political autonomy. The typical
example of this type of region is a country. However, the regions could also be e.g. states,
provinces or counties within a country. The important thing is that the region has some autonomy
over policy instruments affecting the emissions in the region.
A standard result from the literature is that without any type of environmental policy
coordination or other forms of environmental agreements between regions, the outcome will be
socially inefficient. The reason for this is that when a region designs its environmental policy, it
takes into account the effect of its emissions only on its own environment. In a socially efficient
outcome, the effect of emissions in one region on all regions will be taken into consideration.
This result is based on models in which it is assumed that the population in each region is
exogenously given. For regions that are geographically and culturally close to each other, such as
e.g. the states in USA and to some extent the regions/provinces of e.g. Australia and Canada, this
clearly is an unrealistic assumption. In this paper we therefore explore the consequences of an
alternative assumption of the populations in the regions. We consider the case of perfect
population mobility across regions, implying that the same types of people get the same utility in
all regions. Our main finding is that with perfectly mobile populations, we may get an efficient
outcome even if there is no policy coordination or environmental agreement between the regions.
A result similar to ours was first shown by Wellisch (1994, 1995 and 2000 [chapter 6]), who
analyzed the provision of a public good that generates interregional benefit spillovers. He
showed that with perfect population mobility, the non-cooperative equilibrium can be socially
efficient if each region in addition to deciding its level of the public good could set a head tax for
the residents in the region and also give non-negative transfers to the residents of other regions.
2
                                                
1 The term “directly affected” excludes any indirect effects via prices, incomes etc. making actions in one region
affect the environment in other regions. Transboundary environmental problems have received a large attention in
the literature; early contributions include OECD (1976) and d’Arge (1975). See also Markusen (1975), Dasgupta et
al. (1997), and Hoel (1999).
2 An expansion of this idea is in Chapter 9 of Wellisch (2000) in which the land market induces goverments to
pursue efficient policies when intergenerational spillovers are involoved.3
A similar result is shown by Silva (1997), where the public good is pollution abatement, and
where the level of pollution also is affected by the choices made by consumers in each region.
Silva only considers the special case of a unidirectional spillover, i.e. in his 2 region model
region 2 is affected by the consumption choices and the level of abatement in region 1, but not
vice versa. He shows that in this case the efficiency property derived by Wellish is valid (in a
second best sense) also if interregional transfers are ruled out.
The most important difference between our contribution and the above-mentioned articles is that
we derive the efficiency result for very general types of spillovers and for very general
assumptions about what policy instruments are available to the regions. The results of Wellisch
and Silva follow as special cases of the general result we derive. On the other hand, unlike
Wellisch, we only consider the case of perfectly mobile populations. Perfect and costless
population mobility is obviously a simplification. The consequences of imperfect population
mobility in the form of migration costs
3 or locational preferences that differ among persons
4 has
been carefully studied in the literature in the context of models without any environmental
spillover between regions. Our simplifying assumption of perfect population mobility makes it
possible to analyze transboundary pollution without having to make detailed assumptions about
what policy instruments are available to the regions.
The paper is organized as follows. A simple model of a transboundary environmental problem is
introduced in Section 2, where we also give the conditions for efficiency and the non-cooperative
outcome when there is no population mobility. In Section 3 we introduce perfectly mobile
populations. This population mobility implies that utility levels are equalized across regions. The
socially optimal emission levels are the emission levels that maximize this common utility level.
We show that this social optimum is a Nash equilibrium of the game in which regional
governments choose environmental policies without any coordination. In Section 4 we
demonstrate that although the social optimum is a Nash equilibrium, there may also be other
Nash equilibria that are Pareto inferior to the social optimum. Some concluding comments are
given in Section 5.
2 Transboundary pollution without population mobility
To formalize the analysis of a transboundary environmental problem, consider J regions with
emissions (e1, ..., eJ).
5  For each region j there is a variable zj which measures environmental
quality. This variable depends on emissions from all the J regions, and is defined so that it is
declining in all ei. Denoting e=(e1,…,eJ) as the vector of emissions from all regions, we thus have
zj=zj(e) where all partial derivatives  zji are non-positive. The general description includes several
special cases.  One such  is the case of only local environmental damage in which  all the partial
derivatives zji are zero for i≠ j. Another  is the one of a purely unidirectional environmental
problem, as in Silva (1997). Finally, climate change and depletion of the ozone layer are
                                                
3 See e.g. Hercowitz and Pines (1991) and Myers and Papageorgiou (1997).
4 See e.g. Mansoorian and Myers (1993).
5 Transboundary environmental problems may also be of a non-physical kind, such as e.g. a concern about
worldwide biodiversity, see e.g. Barrett (1992). In this paper we interpret our variables as physical emissions
causing environmental damage. However, our results are equally valid for non-physical environmental problems.4
examples of environmental problems for which it is only the sum of emissions from all countries
that matters for the environment
6.  For this special case it is thus only the sum Σ iei that enters as
an argument in the functions zj(e).
Production in region j is higher the larger is its population, as it is assumed that labor input is an
increasing function of the population in the region, denoted by nj. It is also increasing in the
emission level ej. Production is denoted by Fj(nj,ej).
We assume that there is a homogeneous population: everyone is equally productive and all share
the same preferences.
7 In each region j, income and consumption in the region is assumed to be
divided equally among all residents of the region. Moreover, everyone is assumed to have the
same utility function u depending on the per capita consumption and the environmental quality in
the region they live in. To the extent that a person has a preference for one region to another,
everyone shares this preference. There are thus no differences among people in terms of region
preferences.
8
Denoting the per capita consumption in region j by cj, we thus have
)) ( , ( e j j j z c u U = j=1,….,J (1)
While the level of welfare Uj may be specific, the population homogeneity implies homogeneous
preferences.  Thus, there is no regional subscript for the function u(  ).
Total consumption cannot exceed total production, i.e.
∑ ∑ ≤
i i i i i i i e n F c n ) , (( 2 )
A Pareto efficient outcome is an outcome that is on the utility level frontier given the constraint
(2). In most analyses of transboundary pollution, the distribution of the population is assumed
exogenous, i.e. all nj are assumed exogenous. With this assumption all Pareto efficient allocation
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6 These examples are examples of global environmental problems.  Obviously, our model is not suitable for such
problems, since we assume perfect population mobility between all regions involved.
7 In an extended version of this paper, Hoel and Shapiro (2000), we have also considered the case in which there are
different types of persons.
8 This assumption is relaxed in Hoel and Shapiro (2000).
9 See e.g. Markusen ( 1975) or Hoel (1999).5
When there is no cooperation among regions, each region chooses its policies in order to
maximize the utility level of its own residents, taking the policies of other regions as given.
Region j faces the constraint
) , ( j j j j j e n F c n ≤ j=1,….,J (4)
Given the constraint (4), region j maximizes  (1) with respect to ej, taking all other emission
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Comparing this with the condition (3) for Pareto efficiency, we see that the conditions do not
coincide. While each region only takes the effect of its emissions on its own residents into
consideration when designing its optimal policy, the socially efficient allocation of emissions
takes into consideration the effect of each region’s emissions also on the residents of all other
regions. Typically, a non-cooperative equilibrium will have higher emission level than the Pareto
optimal emissions levels (see e.g. Hoel (1999) for a further disussion). This difference is what
makes some kind of cooperation across regions necessary.
3 Population mobility
Let us now assume that there is perfect population mobility. In equilibrium migration eliminates
any potential differences in utility levels between regions.
10 We thus have the following
condition:
J U U U = = = ... 2 1    (6)
Moreover, the total population in the group of regions is given, i.e.
N n
i i = ∑ (7)
Consider first the non-cooperative outcome. This is no longer given by equation (5): The reason
is that (5) describes a balancing of marginal abatement costs with the marginal benefit of an
improved environmental quality, both for a given population. But any change in emissions will
                                                
10 Throughout the paper, we assume that the production and utility functions have properties implying that the
population is positive in all countries in all relevant outcomes. See Hoel and Shapiro (2000) for a further discussion
of the possibility of corner solutions with zero population in some regions.6
generally also affect the allocation of population across regions, and thus give different final
effects on per capita consumption and utility than the effects described by (5).
11
Consider next the social optimum. This is defined as the combination of policies in all regions
that maximizes the common utility level given by (6). The policy combination solving this
maximization problem obviously depends on what the set of feasible policies is. If this set
consists of emission levels in each region and nothing else, we generally will get a different
optimum than we would get if transfers from residents in one region to residents in other regions
also were permitted.
12 In any case, for all reasonable functions entering our analysis, there will
be a solution to the problem of maximizing the common utility level.
13
The social optimum described above has an important feature: It must also be a Nash equilibrium
of the game in which governments in each region choose policies in order to maximize the utility
levels of their own citizens. This follows directly from (6): Since utility levels in all regions are
equal no matter what policies are chosen, any unilateral deviation from the socially efficient
policies by the government of a particular region can never increase the common utility level.
Therefore, such a unilateral deviation from the socially optimal policies on behalf of the
government in a particular region cannot increase the utility level of the citizens in this region.
We can formalize this important result as follows: We have a game in which the players are the J
regional governments. The feasible strategies are the policy choices of the regional governments.
In the model above, the most obvious example would be local contribution to environmental
degradation (ej) as well as the local taxes and transfers to other regions.  However, the reasoning
of our analysis is applicable to larger, and more complex, sets of potential policies or strategies.
Whatever the feasible strategies are, the payoffs are the utilities of the regional citizens Uj.
Market equilibrium restricts the inter-regional distribution of welfare to be such that the utilities
are the same in all regions.
Formally, let  J 2 1 S S S S × × × = L  be the set of feasible strategies with Sj being the set of
strategies for region j.  The regional payoffs depend on the number of residents and the locally
chosen policies. Given the vector s=(s1,…sJ) of local policy choices, consumption levels and
environmental qualities in all regions follow. From the preference function (1) all utility levels
follow, so  we have
) (s j j V U = j=1,…,J (8)
                                                
11 In Hoel and Shapiro (2000) we derive the equations describing the Nash equilibrium. However, we do not need
these for the analysis of the present paper.
12 It is well known from the literature on federalism that even in a simple model without any environmental
variables, a first best social optimum may have transfers from one region to another. Myers (1990) has also
demonstrated that a non-cooperative equilibrium may have voluntary transfers from one region to another.
13 The solution need not be unique. It is easy to construct examples in for which there is a continuum of policy
vectors all giving the same maximal value of the common utility level (see footnote 14).7
From the migration equilibrium condition (6) we know that  utility in all regions must be equal,
whatever the strategy vector s is. This means that the payoff functions Vj(s) must be the same for
all regions, i.e.
) ( ) ( s s V Vj = j=1,…,J (9)
Setting-up the transboundary pollution problem in this way gives us the following theorem:
Theorem:  Let s* ∈  S be the vector of policy choices (e.g. environmental policy and
tax/transfers) that maximizes V(s) subject to feasibility constraints sj∈ Sj; then s* is a Nash
Equilibrium of the policy game described above.
Proof:  Suppose all regions but j make the socially optimal choice, 
*
j − s . Since the payoff to j, Vj,
is identical to V(s), region j makes Vj as large as possible by choosing 
*
j s .
The interpretation of the theorem is obvious: Since free population mobility makes the utility
level in each region equal no matter what policies are chosen at the regional level, all regions
share a common interest in maximizing this common utility level.
The theorem is valid no matter what are the feasible policies: if the available policy instruments
are insufficient for a first best optimum, the second best (constrained) optimum is nevertheless
supportable as Nash Equilibrium.
4 Multiple Nash equilibria
It is tempting to conclude from the previous section that if one has perfectly mobile populations,
it is not necessary to coordinate environmental policies across regions, even when pollution is
transboundary. Such a conclusion is however somewhat premature. The result in the previous
section only states that the social optimum (unconstrained or constrained) is a Nash equilibrium
of the policy game between regions. However, it does not follow that socially efficient strategies
will be the outcome of the non-cooperative game, as there may other Nash equilibria of the
game. If such other Nash equilibria are not socially optimal, they are Pareto dominated by the
social optimum. Although it is often assumed that among Pareto ranked Nash equilibria, the
players will select the best one, it is not obvious that this will be the case.
In the present model there may exist several Nash equilibria. To see this, is it useful to
consider in some more detail the case in which interregional transfers are ruled out.
Without any further restrictions on feasible policies, the policies are simply the emission
levels in the different regions. In other words, our policy vector s is now equivalent to the
emission vector e.
Since interregional transfers are ruled out, it follows from the utility function (1) and the
migration equilibrium (6) that8
)) ( ,
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Together with the balance equation for total population (7), the J-1 equations in (10)
determine the population allocation as functions of the emission vector:
) (e j j n n =  j=1,…,J (11)
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The socially optimal emission vector e* maximizes V(e), and since V(e) is the payoff
vector also for each region, e* is a Nash equilibrium. However, we cannot rule out the
possibility that there exists other emission vectors e’ ≠  e* with the property that (in
obvious notation)
) ' , ( ) ' , ' ( j j j j e V e V − − ≥ e e for all ej≥ 0, j=1,…,J (13)
If this is the case, the vector e’ is a Nash equilibrium.
Whether or not multiple equilibria are “likely” in our very simple model cannot be answered in a
meaningful way. The answer depends on properties of the utility and production functions.
Notice that even if we have standard regularity conditions such as all functions Fj being concave
and u being convex, it is not possible to say much about the properties of the function V(e). The
possibility of multiple Nash equilibria as described by (13) is not ruled out even if the underlying
functions Fj, zj and u satisfy some general concavity/convexity conditions.
Although we cannot say whether or not multiple equilibria are “likely”, a simple example
illustrates the possibility. Consider the simple case of two regions, with identical production
functions. Assume that this production function is concave and homogeneous of degree 1, so that
) ( ) , (
j
j
j j j n
e
f n e n F = (14)
where the function f is increasing and strictly concave in its argument. We also assume that f is
twice differentiable.9
The utility function is given by
) , ( )) , ( , ( 2 1 2 1 e e D c e e z c u j j j − = (15)
where D is a common convex environmental damage function. Ruling out the possibility of
interregional transfers, we thus have
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Normalizing the total population to 1, (17) may be rewritten as
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Inserting this into (16) gives us the following function for the common utility level:
) , ( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 e e D e e f e e V − + = (19)
If the function D is differentiable, the first order condition for the social optimum (e1*,e2*) is
given by
14
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To see the possibility of Nash equilibria that are not socially optimal, let us specify the example
further by assuming that
                                                
14 As mentioned in footnote 13, the social optimum need not be unique. If e.g. D=e1+e2, the sum e1*+e2* would be
uniquely determined by f’(e1*+e2*)=1, but the any combination of e1 and e2 giving this sum will maximize V.
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This environmental damage function corresponds to what Hirshliefer (1983) calls the weakest
link damage function.  Two regions may share a common barrier to environmental damage, e.g.
a dike, and the barrier is only as good as the smallest effort of either region.  For the dike
maintenance example e1 and e2 are the negative of the maintenance efforts.
Inserting (21) and (22) into (19) we get
[] 2 1
5 . 0
2 1 2 1 , max ) ( ) , ( e e e e e e V − + = (23)
 It is straightforward to see that the emission pair that maximizes V is given by
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The best response function for region 1 is the emission level in region 1 that maximizes V, for
any given emission level of region 2. It follows from (25) that this best response function is
given by
[] 2 2 1 25 . 0 , min e e e − = (26)
Similarly, the response function of region 2 is given by
[] 1 1 2 25 . 0 , min e e e − = (27)11
It is clear that all emission levels e1 = e2 ≥  0.125 satisfy both equations (26) and (27), so that they
are Nash equilibria of this game. We thus have a continuum of Nash equilibria. All except the
one given by (24) are Pareto dominated by the latter.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the efficient regulation of transboundary pollution may be possible without
explicit cooperative agreements or central mandates.  What is required is that the policy options
available to each region are adequate; that regions choose policies to maximize the same function
of own-citizen welfare and that individual are fully mobile between regions.  These conditions
are unlikely to be met in general, but, even if the restrictions are unrealistic, the model does point
to an important aspect of policy making.
The conditions set up an interrelationship between autonomous regions that, in itself, can induce
regions to make policy choice consistent with overall welfare maximization while pursuing their
own self-interested objectives.  The migration equilibrium (equal utility) condition generates a
coincidence of interests between the regions.  In equilibrium the welfare of one region is tied to
the welfare of all others: the well being of one region cannot be improved unless the welfare of
all regions improve.  It is not necessary for regions to individually recognize this coincidence;
they need only know the migration responses to their own environmental policy choice.
An interesting aspect of the analysis is that equilibrium policy choices may not be globally
efficient.   They may, instead, be second best efficient in the sense that the chosen policies are
the best, given the limited set of policy options open to regions.  This suggests that central
intervention might take the form of expanding the policy choices open to individual regions
rather than direct regulatory control. The results, however, do not fully mitigate the desirability
of more active central intervention.
Central government may have an important role beyond simply expanding the feasible set of
regional policies.  Although efficient policies are an equilibrium, the equilibrium may not be
unique.  Some form of central coordination can be a mechanism for insuring the best equilibrium
is, in fact, the one achieved.12
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